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The situation in collective memory studies that share a nexus with 
the discipline of International Relations (IR) is currently reflective 
of the traditionally West-centric writing of European history. This 
order of things has become increasingly challenged after the eastern 
enlargement of the European Union (EU). This article examines 
Poland’s and the Baltics’ recent attempts to enlarge the mnemonic 
vision of ‘the united Europe’ by placing their ‘subaltern pasts’ in contest 
with the conventionally Western European-bent understanding of the 
consequences of World War II in Europe. I argue that their endeavours 
to wrench the ‘European mnemonical map’ apart in order to become 
more congruent with the different historical experiences within the 
enlarged EU encapsulate the curious trademark of Polish and Baltic 
post-Cold War politics of becoming European: their combination of 
simultaneously seeking recognition from and resisting the hegemonic 
‘core European’ narrative of what ‘Europe’ is all about.
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The situation in collective memory studies that share a nexus with IR is cur-
rently reflective of the traditionally West-centric writing of European history. 
So far, the main focus of students of the relationship between collective 
memory and international politics has largely been on German or the other 
West European collective remembrance practices, and their implications 
for inter national relations. While the recollection of the Holocaust has 
become increasingly institutionalized and internationalized, the crimes of 
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the communist regimes and their traumatic repercussions for contemporary 
European politics have hardly received comparable academic and political 
attention. Eastern European memories of World War II are still les lieux 
d’oubli rather than parts of les lieux de mémoire of the officially endorsed 
collective European remembrance of the war (cf. Nora, 1995; Wood, 1999). 
The realities of the war in Eastern Europe have generally been concealed in 
the Western public consciousness and formed the byways rather than insti-
tutionalized parts of the ‘European account’ of World War II. Moreover, 
their analysis as on a par with Western European experiences with the 
atrocities of World War II remains a topic of debate even among the critical 
memory scholars.
This order of things has been progressively challenged after the eastern 
enlargement of the EU, however. The ‘new Europeans’ are contesting the 
memorial status of their experiences of World War II in the EU-endorsed 
remembrance of this war as ultimately a ‘good war’ where the Allied Coal-
ition was supposedly acting on the common ground of anti-Nazism (cf. 
Davies, 2006: 246). This seeming mnemonical consensus has been gradually 
unravelling from multiple angles lately, as Zehfuss’s (2007) account of the 
controversial memory politics of World War II in Germany and Davies’s 
(2007) compelling re-examination of the conventional narrative of World 
War II illuminate. We could distinguish at least four major mnemonic com-
munities in the European memory landscape in relation to World War II: 
Atlantic-Western European, German, East-Central European and Russian. 
Their remembrances of the war focus respectively on D-Day of 1944 and the 
Allied Victory in Europe on 8 May 1945; manifold traumas resulting from 
the experience of bombing raids and total defeat; the trials of undergoing 
Nazi and Soviet occupations in succession; and the comfort drawn from 
the costly victory in ‘The Great Patriotic War’ (Jarausch and Lindenberger, 
2007: 4).
The Baltic states and Poland have emerged in the vanguard of the so-
called ‘new European’ commemorative politics, demanding the inclusion 
of their wartime experiences in the pan-European remembrance of this war. 
Even a cursory look at the central themes in the Baltic and Polish post-
EU accession foreign and security political debates will reveal their quite 
remarkable preoccupation with the implications and ramifications of World 
War II in Eastern Europe. The Latvian president’s applauding of the NATO 
summit in Riga in November 2006 as a sign of the ultimate end of World 
War II in the region; the Polish prime minister’s pointing to Poland’s suffer-
ing in the war as a moral argument for giving it the voting weight of much 
more populous Germany in the EU Council of Ministers in June 2007; 
the Estonian government’s reordering of the World War II-related sites 
of memory in the country — all this speaks of the increasing invocation of 
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the traditionally subaltern collective remembrance practices in these East 
European states’ foreign policy-making of the day.
Polish and Baltic political elites’ endeavours to wrench the ‘European 
mnemonical map’ apart in order to become more congruent with the dif-
ferent historical experiences within the enlarged EU, as well as to gain EU 
support for influencing Russia to acknowledge its responsibility for the crimes 
of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet occupation in 
the Baltic states, demonstrate the curious trademark of their politics of 
becom ing European: a combination of simultaneously seeking recognition 
from and exercising resistance to the hegemonic ‘core European’ narrative 
of what ‘Europe’ is all about.
This article critically engages with the significance of memory politics 
in Polish and Baltic post-Cold War processes of becoming European as a 
pivotal resistance move to their traditionally liminal status in Europe. Polish 
and Baltic politics of ‘becoming European’ is conceived here as a quest to be 
part of the ‘true Europe’ as opposed to ‘Europe but not quite Europe’ — 
a position they have been designated by Western Europeans since the 
Enlighten ment (cf. Wolff, 1994; Connolly, 1999). Their ‘becoming 
European’ has essentially been a struggle to gain recognition of Poland’s 
and the Baltics’ ‘full Europeanness’ from the authoritative social carriers of 
this desired identity and the concurrent rebellion against the occurrences of 
perceived misrecognition of Eastern Europe as ‘lesser European’ compared 
to its Western counterpart. If we regard coming to terms with the past as 
reinforcement of one’s self-consciousness (cf. Adorno, 1986: 128), Polish 
and Baltic calls for equal remembrance of their pasts emerge as an essential 
part of their individuation process as European, of their becoming a 
European subject.
The first two sections of the article outline the different phases of 
remembering and the consequently diverging narratives of World War II in 
the East and West of Europe. I then turn to the case in focus used to explore 
the memory-political dimension of Polish and Baltic post-EU accession 
politics of becoming European. This part of the study draws on a discourse 
analysis of foreign policy establishments’ speeches and interventions on the 
implications of World War II and the crimes of the communist regimes in 
Poland and the Baltic states against the backdrop of the commemoration 
of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow in 2005.1 
I argue that Poland’s and the Baltics’ insistence on ‘setting the past record 
straight’ by seeking an all-European condemnation of the crimes of Soviet 
com munism in Eastern Europe as equal to those of Nazism signals their 
fundamental insecurity about their immediate past’s compatibility with the 
Western European states’ own, and thus their persistent sense of ‘liminal 
Europeanness’ in the enlarged EU. Their excessive pondering on the memory 
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of the Western betrayal of Eastern Europe in World War II thus emerges as 
a key indicator of their European identity-related insecurities, revealing 
uncertainty about ‘whether the past really is past, over and concluded, or 
whether it continues, albeit in different forms’ (see Said, 1994: 3).
At the same time, however, the Baltics’ and Poland’s increasing emphasis 
on the ‘right to memory’ also implies their escape from the restrictions 
inherent in their ‘memory work’ during the EU and NATO accession pro-
cesses. In the course of this ritually liminal phase of becoming European, 
certain elements of their past had to be consciously put on hold without an 
opportunity to reflect on them in any deep manner before the context had 
become more ‘enabling’ for such reflection and, consequently, for a more 
auton omous construction of their selves. The Baltic and Polish foreign 
policy-making elites’ reaffirmation of their countries’ special situation in the 
context of World War II and resistance to the mnemopolitical authority of 
the West in delineating the contents of post-war ‘European history’ thus also 
signify Eastern Europe’s post-EU accession ideological decolonization. As 
such, Poland and the Baltics challenge Western Europe’s intention to act as 
the model for the whole of Europe, by which Western Europe sets the rules 
of remembrance to the ‘new Europeans’ even after their formal acceptance 
into the EU. The post-EU accession memory-political endeavours of Poland 
and the Baltic states could thus be conceived of as an attempt to insert 
a moment of radical heterogeneity into the historically largely Western 
European construction of ‘Europe’ — its history, memory and identity — 
and to consequently pluralize the ways of being European.
A separate question is to what extent the ‘old Europeans’ would actually 
be willing to listen to the counter-narratives of the Easterners, or, moreover, 
whether the multitude of immediate historical perspectives in the ‘new’ 
and ‘old’ Europe could actually be reconciled into a more coherent and 
consensual new narrative without the silencing, subjugation or blunt 
forgetting of some stories for the sake of imposing and endorsing the 
dominance of others.2 After all, remembering and forgetting are by definition 
contentious issues. The memorial militancy of the ‘new Europeans’ has not 
always struck a resonant chord among their Western counterparts who have 
attempted to form a common European identity by ‘drawing a line’ under 
World War II. Yet again, the Baltic and Polish memory politics have brought 
up the controversial and intensely debated comparison between Nazi and 
Stalinist regimes and their respective crimes, thus contesting the uniqueness 
of Nazi crimes and questioning the singularity of the Holocaust as the crime 
against humanity of the 20th century. The upsurge of World War II-related 
memories in the East has thus often been regarded as obstructing the progress 
of the European project (cf. Bell, 2006). Against that backdrop, this article 
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concludes with a critical discussion of the perspectives for the emergence of 
a more coherent and common ‘memoryscape’ for the enlarged EU.
It is striking that the attempts of the ‘new Europeans’ to introduce their 
‘counter-histories’ to ‘old Europe’ in fact reflect the very ‘core European’ 
quest for security through integration in order to avoid fragmentation. 
Indeed, their calls for a broader European historical consciousness as a pre-
condition for solidarity within the enlarged European polity implicitly regard 
the integration of distinct European experiences and memories as a panacea 
against future conflict (Kelam, 2008; Roszkowski et al., 2008). Moreover, 
the underlying assumption of the achievability of a common European 
mnemonical vision is in itself reflexive of the typically Western search for 
totality and universality through the creation of common structures (cf. 
McLennan, 2003: 75). The curiosity of the Baltic and Polish memory 
politics of becoming European therefore lies in their attempts to articulate 
their distinctive historical experiences from the perspective of the signifying 
position of the ‘European subalterns’ while resisting the totalization of the 
‘European majority memory of World War II’, and yet assuming the real 
possibility of a unified and coherent common European remembrance of the 
war in the first place.
Reclaiming the ‘Right to Memory’
Orientation to the past, rather than to the future, has often been regarded 
as part of some putative ‘East European syndrome’. Yet, this typically 
Orientalist approach obscures the fact that memory, as well as forgetting, is 
a constitutive feature of any culture or social imaginary (cf. Zehfuss, 2006). 
Furthermore, the claims of a ‘special historicism’ of East European peoples, 
their heightened propensity to understand the present through the past and 
thus to see history as a weight restraining and enabling the choices that can 
be made in the present, deny the extent to which the ‘memory boom’ has 
also been a firm accompaniment in Western European societies in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. This is nevertheless not to defy the ‘historical 
nature’ of postcolonial peoples as the flourishing ‘minority memories’ pro-
vide an important resource and means for regaining the past as part of a 
collectivity’s identity-formation after decolonization. Yet, the idea of ‘native 
East European historicism’ has also been self-serving for the West, enabling 
it to disregard its own engagement in shaping the region’s immediate past 
history. The permanence of the past in the former communist societies has 
not been an indication of another special ‘East European pathology’, but is 
merely consistent with the pattern of identity-formation in modern nation-
states (Wydra, 2007: 238–9).
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The intensity of the presence of the past of 60 years in the current 
self-reflections of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland reverberates an 
archetypical outburst of suppressed memories, a delayed affirmation of the 
‘right to memory’ and the consequent efforts to release them from the 
burden of the officially mandated Soviet interpretations of World War II 
(see Judt, 2005: 821; Müller, 2002: 9). It further demonstrates critical 
attempts to break with the past by drawing lessons from it; indeed, to secure 
identity by reappropriating and reaffirming one’s collective memory (see 
Norton, 1993: 460). While Western European nations had the privilege 
of starting anew immediately after World War II by drawing a clear line 
under the horrors of the past with what Winston Churchill (1946) called a 
‘blessed act of oblivion’, Eastern Europe had to wait for its chance to begin 
peeling back the layers of ideological reinterpretations of its past(s) decades 
later. This is not to say, however, that the post-war ‘new start’ in Western 
European countries, such as in Germany and France, for instance, was in any 
way immediate and unproblematic. The ‘blessed act of oblivion’ in post-
war Western European states that was thought necessary for their national 
recuperation also fostered a myriad of mismemories, self-delusions and myths 
about their respective roles in the war, as we know from the work of Tony 
Judt (1992, 1994), among others (cf. Deák et al., 2000). Furthermore, in 
the Germans’ case, it was impermissible to legitimately remember their indi-
vidual sufferings in World War II (such as the Allied bombings of German 
cities, the flight and expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe and the 
painful ‘liberation’ of Germany in 1945) until recently, as the immensity 
of the internationally induced collective guilt overwhelmed and disabled all 
other public recollections of the war (cf. Zehfuss, 2007).
Nevertheless, there has been a fundamental temporal mismatch between 
phases of ‘freezing’ and ‘unfreezing’ of war memories in Western and 
Eastern Europe. Eastern Europeans’ experiences of the war were ‘frozen’ for 
open historical debate and critical discussion for more than 40 years over the 
Cold War because of the Soviet regime’s use of ‘organized forgetting’ and 
‘communicative silencing’ as a political technique of control over the sub-
jugated populations in the Eastern bloc (Wydra, 2007: 228). Although there 
was indeed an analogous ‘glacis’ of certain parts of the World War II-related 
past(s) in Western European countries in the immediate post-war years — 
as succinctly captured by Henry Rousso (1991) in his analysis of France’s 
‘Vichy syndrome’ of denying, misremembering and abusing the memory of 
the wartime regime — this ‘freezing’ was nevertheless largely self-imposed. 
Indeed, it was a conscious choice of forgetting certain traumatic parts of 
one’s past in order to provide a safe interregnum in which the building of a 
new identity could begin (Wydra, 2007: 226).
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The first phase of the breakout from the Soviet-enforced official 
mnemonical stasis of Eastern Europe began only in the immediate aftermath 
of the Cold War. The initial stage of the public defrosting of the post-
socialist countries’ memories meant engaging with former taboo subjects and 
revealing the falsifications and distortions of the past imposed upon them by 
the ‘mnemonical hibernation’ of the communist period (cf. Kwas´niewski, 
2002). Such forced mnemonical cover-up had certainly applied to official 
forms of collective remembrance during the Soviet period, not least due to 
Eastern European societies being deprived of channels for their memories’ 
political articulation and resources for collective protest and resistance. 
Forms of communicative and cultural memory, which remained largely 
beyond the control of centralized power, were nevertheless maintained even 
under the Soviet regime, as could be observed in instances like the revo-
lutions in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980 
(cf. Assmann, 1992). Moreover, opponents of communist regimes learned 
to exploit the outward manifestations of conformity for their own ends, thus 
allowing the curious practice of mnemonical ‘double discourse’ to flourish 
(cf. Lebow, 2003: 327; Miłosz, 1953).
If memory is by definition an ‘arena of conflict’ between forgetting as 
an action directed against the past, and the return of the forgotten,3 this 
truism was vividly played out in Eastern Europe after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. Having been forced into a prolonged phase of mnemopolitical 
liminality over the communist period, Poland and the Baltic states had a 
chance to publicly evaluate their experiences of World War II only after the 
collapse of their respective communist regimes (Judt, 1992: 95; Szakolczai, 
2000: 223; Wydra, 2007: 227–30). Eastern Europeans’ public reassertion of 
their right to give voice to their own pasts in the post-Cold War phase also 
served to provide inspiration and consolation to people suddenly confronted 
with radical social and political change, a general sense of uprootedness, 
confusion, uncertainty and ‘the stigma of being poor, backward cousins in 
the European family’ (Mostov, 1998: 376).
Poland’s and the Baltics’ more recent, post-EU accession attempts to 
bring their pasts to the fore in the debates over European identity and 
security reflect their growing vocal claim for an ‘equal subjectivity’ in the 
European mnemopolitical field as well as demonstrating their increasing 
sense of confidence about the density of their ties to the Euro-Atlantic 
security community. This, in turn, enables them to remind their Western 
European counterparts openly about the need to remember European 
history in all its complexity as well as to discover the ‘other in oneself’. 
What we witness now is hence a different kind of unfreezing of memory: the 
Eastern Europeans’ casting off the restraints that the West had applied on 
their ‘memory work’ during the enlargement process of the EU and NATO. 
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Whereas during this explicitly liminal phase in their ‘becoming European’ the 
candidate countries had to keep a low profile in reflecting on the historical 
sources of their mutually antagonistic relations with Russia, they are now 
all the more forcefully pushing for their ‘remembrance right’ to their own 
narrative of the events and aftermath of World War II. Reminding the West 
of its accountability for the Eastern European post-war security predicament 
has added a further critical European dimension to the most recent round of 
Polish and Baltic memory politics.
‘Our History is Your History Too’: Hegemonic and 
Counter-hegemonic European Narratives of World War II
Revealing the ‘historical truth’ about the implications of World War II in 
Eastern Europe, by drawing attention to and seeking a pan-European acknow-
ledgement of East European sufferings in the war, has become one of the 
key missions of Polish and Baltic post-EU accession foreign policy. Aiming 
to shake the Western European versions of the immediate European past, 
Polish and Baltic foreign policy-makers have called for the ‘Europeanization’ 
of ‘European’ memories: the inclusion of their distinct historical experience 
of World War II into the common historical consciousness of Europe.
While the experiences of East and West Europe in World War II were dif-
ferent, a common frame for their interpretation should not be an impossibility, 
or so their argument goes. The issue here is really not the ‘absolute’ or 
‘relative weight’ of pain inflicted by the Nazi and Soviet regimes, but how 
the consequences of the pain — in terms of justice rendered but also justice 
attempted — are perceived in different parts of Europe (cf. Irwin-Zarecka, 
1994: 78). The wounds of collective memory are arguably difficult to heal if 
they go publicly unnoticed. The Baltic states and Poland are asking Western 
Europe to broaden its set patterns of remembering Europe’s immediate past 
by trying to step into the shoes of Eastern European countries. In order to 
reach their aim, they are determined to make their voice heard, to make their 
past acquire a firm presence in the pan-European historical consciousness 
and interpretation of its immediate past history (e.g. Vīķe-Freiberga, 2004). 
Since ‘every Pole and every Estonian’ is part of European history, as the late 
president of Estonia argued, it purportedly gives an obligation to take into 
account Eastern European tragic experiences, ‘our tens of Katyns of which 
most are still nameless and unknown till this day, to the consciousness of 
European, American and Russian democrats’ (see Meri, 1993; cf. Meri, 
1999b; Kalniete, 2003).
There has indeed been a noticeable imbalance in both the remembering 
and the study of immediate past in the East and West of Europe. While 
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the atrocities of the Nazis have been analysed with remarkable rigour and 
depth, reaching even the levels of meta-criticism of Holocaust memory and 
representations (but cf. Lukas, 1997), the crimes of the communist regimes 
in the former Soviet bloc have not received similar academic and political 
attention in Europe.4 The investigators of the communist crimes have been 
‘hopelessly at a disadvantage’ when compared to the investigators of the 
Nazi crimes, not merely as regards access to archives and resources, but also 
in terms of the moral and financial support of political and academic circles 
(cf. Meri, 1999a).5 Reflecting the different experiences of the West and East 
of Europe in World War II, this imbalance has largely been due to the fact 
that the legacy of Nazism has simply been more immanent and the reflection 
on it thus more urgent than that of communism to the traditional writers 
of ‘European history’ — the Western European states. Moreover, West 
Europeans’ heightened alertness towards Nazism’s monstrosities has been 
all the more amplified for it having arisen in the heart of ‘civilized Europe’, 
while communism could easily be shelved under the category of ‘normal 
aberrations’ in the ‘Russian borderland of Europe’ (Malia, 1999: xii).
Yet, the asymmetry in the remembering and research on the respective 
regimes’ criminal records could also be attributable to the simple fact that 
there has never been a Soviet Nuremberg process of a sort which, after all, 
made technically possible the documentation of the crimes of Nazism in the 
first place. Since a similar lustration vis-a-vis communism’s legacy in Europe 
has never occurred,6 the 20th-century history of Europe has arguably largely 
bypassed the Eastern European component, thus leading to a ‘one-legged, 
one-sided, one-eyed’ account of Europe’s immediate past (Davies, 2006: 
41).
The late Estonian president Lennart Meri remarked with some irony in 
the early 1990s that everybody was talking about the death of communism, 
yet no one had actually seen its body. The Polish and Baltic endeavours to 
seek international condemnation of the crimes of the communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe could be regarded as attempts to reify the 
very demise of communism, or, indeed, to disinter its ‘body’.7 The impartial 
reassessment of Europe’s immediate history is thus presented as an issue of 
European security, for allegedly ‘the re-evaluation of the dark spots of history 
builds confidence and promotes cooperation among states’ (Pabriks, 2005).
Yet again, reifying the end of communism has been more problematic than 
that of Nazism, not least for the lack of a clear historical rupture with the 
former unlike the one that occurred with ‘burying’ the latter at the end of 
World War II. While the circumstances of the end of Nazism made it possible 
to actually isolate its ‘body’ by blaming its ‘carriers’ and the perpetrators of 
the regime’s crimes for everything evil that had occurred in World War II 
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in Western Europe, the fortune of the largely peaceful end of communism 
in 1989–91 has, if somewhat paradoxically, also been part of the problem 
with doing away with communism’s problematic legacy in Eastern European 
states. The Polish and Baltic foreign policy-making elites’ vigorous attempts 
to externalize their experiences of communism have also been remarkably 
uncritical and self-delusional at times, essentially camouflaging the extent to 
which the communist system and practices were actually internalized by the 
very people who lived for decades under this regime.
Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the search for the ‘body of com-
munism’, the Polish and Baltic post-EU accession politics of memory emerges 
as a self-appointed mission to remind Europe about the complexities of its 
own past (e.g. Ilves, 2003). After all, as the Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga emphasizes, while the end of World War II meant liberation for 
the West, it meant ‘slavery, occupation, subjugation and Stalinist terror’ for 
the East (2005a, 2005b). The criticism of the Allies’ compliance with the 
demands of the Stalinist Soviet Union at Yalta and the consequent Western 
moral co-responsibility for the closing off of Eastern Europe behind the 
Iron Curtain during the Cold War thus runs as a red thread through the 
mnemo political discourse of Poland and the Baltic states. Although proudly 
emphasizing that the Western bringing of Eastern Europe into its fold should 
not happen ‘just for the sake of historical justice or because of their assumed 
feelings of guilt’, these two principles were nevertheless the main sword in 
the hands of Eastern Europeans in their post-Cold War endeavours to join 
the Euro-Atlantic structures. At the end of the day, the dual enlargement 
was framed entirely as the undoing of historic injustice towards Eastern 
European states; indeed, as a decomposition of the ‘Yalta order’, both by the 
‘demand’- and ‘supply’-side of the process.
Yet, while making up for the old Yalta ‘betrayal’ was a psychologically 
puri fying fact, much remains to be purged from the understandings of the 
immediate past in the now common European house. Emphasizing the duty 
of the European collective memory to do justice to the victims of communism 
and Nazism together, Poland and the Baltic Three insist that forgetting the 
meaning of the communist legacy in Eastern Europe would amount to a 
loss of Europe’s moral compass. Europe is argued to have an obligation to 
remember the events of 60 years ago as European identity cannot supposedly 
stand apart from the responsibility for the past of the whole of Europe (e.g. 
Kristovskis, 2008). Polish and Baltic Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) have been particularly vigorous in criticizing the imbalance of the 
EU’s historical approach that grants the victims of communism a ‘second-
class status’, calling for a common European effort to urge Russia to assess 
its own history and to apologize for the crimes of Soviet totalitarianism (e.g. 
Kelam, 2008).8
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Combining discourses of redemption, suffering and unjust treatment, 
Polish and Baltic memory politics occasionally falls prey to so-called ‘com-
parative martyrology’ on the question of who has suffered the most (cf. 
Donskis, 1999: 478). As Eastern Europe arguably suffered in World War II 
for the sake of Western Europe’s relative security and well-being, rec ognition 
and legitimation from Western Europe is sought for its very special moral 
worth. For the old members of the EU, the Polish and the Baltic repre-
sentatives’ constant appellations about Eastern Europe’s historical suffering 
are awkward and occasionally irritating as their self-attributed martyrdom 
reminds the West of its co-responsibility for the complexity of the region’s 
immediate past, and thus about ‘the other in themselves’ as well. Since victim-
hood gives the right to complain, to protest and make demands, Western 
Europe is placed in the uncomfortable position of owing a debt to Eastern 
Europe (cf. Todorov, 2003: 142–3).
Yet, remembrance of one’s own woes tends to generally overrun the ability 
to perceive the suffering of others as if empathizing with the suffering of the 
others would reduce one’s own relative suffering (cf. Courtois, 1999: 21). 
All collective recollections of World War II are accordingly inevitably partial, as 
the absorption of one’s own post-war predicament (especially in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the war) awarded only a very low priority to remembering 
the tragedies of others, of those who were more peripheral to one’s own 
respective national existence (Dower, 2004: 226; Lagrou, 2004: 411).
Western European countries that had experienced the trauma of defeat 
and occupation in World War II (i.e. France, Belgium, the Netherlands) felt 
a deep need for patriotic memories and renewed national epics, although this 
did not leave much space for their immediate post-war commemoration of 
the destruction of European Jews, as the memory of the genocide was not 
of particularly constructive value for their respective patriotic memories.9 
Similarly, the memory of the Western failure to keep Eastern European 
states from falling behind the Iron Curtain had a remarkably low benefit for 
Western Europeans’ image of their own national martyrdom (cf. Lagrou, 
2004: 411; Lebow, 2006: 29–32). Nonetheless, since the international cele-
brations of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995, there 
have been continuous attempts to transform the fragmented West European 
memories of Nazi aggression and occupation into a more ‘shared and self-
critical memory of an era of European human-rights abuses that unites 
former victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, and lends legitimacy to the 
European Union’ (Kansteiner, 2006: 120–30). This construction has further 
enabled the retroactive inclusion of Germany in the renewed European 
remembrance of World War II, with Schröder’s declaration of the Allied 
campaign as a victory for Europe as well as for Germany (2005; cf. Zehfuss, 
2007: 203–8; Olick, 1999).
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The Politics of World War II Commemoration in Moscow
The ‘interpretation war’ over the meaning of the end of World War II for 
different European countries reached its peak during the debates around the 
commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of the war in Moscow. 
The questions of what precisely to commemorate, whether or not Moscow 
was the appropriate place for this commemoration in the first place, and 
when the end of World War II should be commemorated were all brought 
to the surface in the battles between competing historical narratives of the 
Baltic states and Poland, Russia and the former Western allies. The clash 
of narratives about the meaning and ramifications of World War II led to 
mutual insinuations about attempts to rewrite history between Russia and 
the Baltic states, in particular, as they struggled to win Western sympathy 
and support for their contradictory stories of their immediate past. The 
com memoration controversy of 2005 epitomized the complex interaction 
between three different levels of Polish and Baltic memory politics over the 
implications of World War II, namely, the domestic, bilateral and European 
planes of debating the filtering of historical facts through particular cultural 
lenses (see Onken, 2007).
For Russians, 9 May 1945 is the date of the Soviet Union’s final victory 
over Nazi Germany, signifying the end of a war in which they suffered 
massive losses. Indeed, it was on 9 May 1945 that the war ended for the 
Soviet Union as the defenders of Berlin finally surrendered.10 It is therefore 
a ‘sacred day’ for Russia; ‘one of the most memorable and important dates’ 
in the history of the Russian people, the ‘closest, sincerest and most truly 
national holiday’ that marks ‘a victory of civilisation over barbarism in the 
form of fascism’ (see Putin, 2005b, 2005c). The commemorative ceremonies 
of Victory Day, as it is called in Russia, are thus one of the main reservoirs 
of the modern Russian collective memory, sustaining the progress-glorifying 
messianism that communist Russia tried to embody in the course of the 20th 
century and perhaps even retaining an age-old Russian general messianism 
that pre-dates communism. Altogether, the victory of World War II is the 
only victory of the Russian people that is celebrated throughout the world 
today; indeed, the last event in which modern Russia can proudly claim 
some thing universal in its specificity (cf. Minaudier, 2007). As such, 9 
May also harbours considerable potential for Russia’s self-affirmation as a 
‘normal’ European country, not as permanently erring from the ‘normal’ 
course of development associated with the West (see Wydra, 2007: 238). 
The declaration of 8 and 9 May as Days of Remembrance and Reconciliation 
by the United Nations in 2004 is therefore proudly presented as a special 
success for Russia and the other Commonwealth of Independent States’ 
diplomacy.
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For the Western Allies, World War II ended in Europe on 8 May 1945 
when the capitulation act of the German army was signed in Reims in 
France,11 and 9 May has a different meaning in the EU: it is celebrated as 
Europe Day in order to commemorate Robert Schuman’s call in 1950 for 
recognition of the fact that European cooperation sprang from the need 
to reconcile different European nations with each other. For the Eastern 
European states, there are further ‘multiple endings of World War II’. The 
restoration of their independence in the early 1990s, the withdrawal of the 
remnants of the Soviet army from the Baltic states, their inclusion in the EU 
and NATO, and, most recently, even the hosting of a NATO summit in Riga 
in November 2006 have all been applauded as a sign of the ultimate end of 
World War II in the region. The date 9 May has thus no single meaning 
that is univocally shared throughout Europe: the liberation from the Nazi 
scourge for Western Europe and the Soviet Union was only half a liberation 
for Eastern Europeans as the day, when according to Putin ‘great justice was 
done’ (2005b), marked the beginning of an era of new injustice for them by 
their subjection to Soviet rule.
The commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War 
II as a major celebration of the victory and reconciliation in Moscow on 9 
May 2005 was therefore bound to be controversial. The Russian president 
Vladimir Putin had invited over 50 world leaders to attend a military parade 
on Red Square in order to celebrate ‘the victory of good over evil and of 
free dom over tyranny’, the ‘peace and triumph of justice’ (Putin, 2005b, 
2005c); indeed, ‘the Victory of Life over Death’ (Lavrov, 2005). The 
Victory Day commemorations in Moscow were thus meant to remind the 
inter national community of the decisive role Russia played in winning World 
War II as well as to celebrate the master narrative of Russian identity against 
the backdrop of the war according to which Russia was the heroic liberator 
of Europe from the Nazi curse. The aim of the celebrations was therefore 
not merely ‘upholding the historical truth about the war’, but also ‘fixing 
firmly in public consciousness a correct understanding of its lessons from the 
viewpoint of contemporary world development’ (Lavrov, 2005).
The very attempt to fix ‘a correct understanding of the past’, noticeably 
devoid of self-criticism, touched the crux of the problem for the Baltic states 
and Poland which do not share the Russian interpretation of the outcomes 
of World War II. Referring to their unwillingness to celebrate the glory of 
the Soviet victory on the day that symbolizes the beginning of a new era of 
oppression for the Baltic states, and emphasizing the need to distinguish 
between commemorating the victims of the war from the attempts to 
eulogize the ideological inheritance of the Soviet totalitarian regime, the 
presidents of Lithuania and Estonia — Valdas Adamkus and Arnold Rüütel — 
therefore declined Putin’s invitation, after much debate in their respective 
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countries. The presidents of Latvia and Poland, however, decided to attend 
the commemorative events in Moscow for the very same reason: to draw 
international attention to the complexity of the outcomes of World War II 
in Poland and the Baltic states by showing how the Allied victory over Nazi 
Germany was ‘only a partial victory’ as the Western democracies ‘accepted 
without protest the renewed subjugation of over a dozen countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe by the totalitarian communism of the Soviet 
empire and its satellites’ (Vīķe-Freiberga, 2005d). Moreover, while the 
official Russian narrative tends to equate the beginning of World War II 
for Russia with the beginning of their Great Patriotic War when the Nazis 
invaded the Soviet Union (i.e. 22 June 1941), the Baltic states and Poland 
emphasize that the seeds of the conflagration, not to mention the invasion 
of Poland and the Baltics, were sown already with the Nazi–Soviet pact of 
1939. Arguably then, had Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union not agreed 
to secretly divide the territories of Eastern Europe among themselves, World 
War II might not have occurred. Since it is both Hitler and Stalin who ‘bear 
the brunt of the blame’ for the war, these ‘two totalitarian tyrants’ should be 
mentioned by name, as well as commemorating the crimes against humanity 
of both; lest the responsibility they bear for beginning that war be forgotten 
(Vīķe-Freiberga, 2005d).
Hence, the Baltic states and Poland on the one side and Russia on the 
other have clashingly contradictory narratives of World War II. What was 
glory for Russia, was humiliation for the Baltic states and Poland; what Russia 
as the legal successor of the Soviet Union celebrates as its victory in World 
War II, the Baltic Three and Poland execrate as a loss of independence, 
identity and thus their meaningful existence. The collective memories of 
World War II in Russia and Poland and the Baltic Three have thus proved 
to be incommensurable to date, and the end of the war is an event still seen 
in completely different lights.
Paraphrasing Tzvetan Todorov, we could thus say that the Russian 
commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II consti-
tuted an attempt to adapt the past to the needs of the present by claiming 
credit for the decisive significance of the Soviet army in the course of World 
War II and thus emphasizing the role of Russia in the constitution of modern 
Europe. The focus of the respective memory-political moves of the Baltics 
and Poland has, however, rather been on the rememoration of the end of 
the war in order to try to explain the complex outcomes of it for different 
European nations; or, indeed, to grasp the ‘truth of the past’ (2003: 133). 
After all, for the Western democracies which had never actually fought the 
USSR, the ‘evilness’ of Stalin could not quite compete with that of Hitler in 
their popular consciousness, thus leaving the Baltic states and Poland with 
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quite a bit of ‘revelatory work’ to do on the ‘Western front’ (cf. Davies, 
2006: 242–3).12
The Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, in particular, launched a 
vigorous initiative to introduce the dubious outcome of World War II in 
the Baltic states to the international community, receiving thus an acknow-
ledgement as the Lady der Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the German 
press. In order to avoid the reefs of belittling the significance of the victory 
over Nazism while condemning the crimes of Soviet totalitarianism, Vīķe-
Freiberga chose to draw a clear distinction between the meanings of 8 May 
and 9 May, thus distancing the Latvian, or Baltic, understanding of the 
end of World War II from the Russian interpretation and emphasizing the 
signi ficance of 9 May as Europe Day instead. Vīķe-Freiberga’s statements 
regarding the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World 
War II in Moscow in 2005 were explicitly intent on revealing the ‘other side’ 
of the Soviet participation in the war, as well as calling for Western support 
to encourage Russia to express its regret over the post-war subjugation of 
Eastern Europe as a direct ramification of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
(MRP).
Vīķe-Freiberga thus made a conscious attempt to enlarge the semiotic 
field of connotations of World War II in the Western public imaginary by 
emphasizing that while the Allied victory over Nazi Germany was indeed 
a ‘victory of democratic values over totalitarianism and tyranny’ (2005c), 
it was nevertheless a victory that failed to bring freedom to ‘the other half 
of Europe’ (2006). Therefore, as ‘no wound can truly heal if it is festering 
beneath the surface’, Russia should follow the example of Germany who has 
repeatedly apologized for its Nazi past, ‘by expressing its genuine regret for 
the crimes of the Soviet regime’, in particular for its occupation of the Baltic 
states for 50 years, or ‘it will continue to be haunted by the ghosts of its past, 
and its relations with its immediate neighbours will remain uneasy at best’ 
(2005c, 2005d, 2006). Similar calls were made by her Estonian, Lithuanian 
and Polish counterparts.
Russia’s reaction has, however, been all but apologetic: the official Russian 
line denies the equivalence of Stalin with Hitler. Russia’s critical self-
reflection against the backdrop of World War II has been hamstrung by the 
fact that for Russians, perhaps more than for any other nation, the crimes 
and acts of heroism in the war are embedded in the very same historical 
mo ment. Russia’s difficulties in critically engaging with its communist legacy 
are all the more problematic because the Soviet era marked a period of 
unpre cedented international power for the country, and a critical assessment 
of this period is therefore seen as a potential challenge to its position in the 
inter national arena at the time. Against that backdrop, Stalin’s role tends to 
be viewed in Russia first and foremost as a saviour from the ‘Nazi curse’ and 
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not repudiated for his regime’s mass repressions, either in Russia itself or in 
the former Soviet Union as a whole.
Putin demonstrates the cunning pick-and-choose approach to history that 
Russia so frequently entertains while engaging with its communist legacy: 
when useful to today’s Russia, the country’s direct legal succession from the 
Soviet Union is emphasized; when harmful, however, such as in the case 
of admitting to the criminal acts of the previous regime, Russia’s direct 
succession from the USSR is refuted.13 After all, admitting responsibility for 
an act through an apology commits one to some form of reparation. Putin 
there fore argues that a Russian apology to the Baltic states for the repressions 
of the Soviet regime ‘would be fairly logical only if these peoples had been at 
any time citizens of the Russian Federation’ — which they, of course, never 
were (2005a). Nevertheless, Putin’s speeches do not actually contain traces 
of the widely accepted idea in Russia that the annexation of the Baltic states 
was legitimate since it was allegedly based on legitimate referenda. Putin 
has even expressed regret for the Baltic states’ historical usage as a ‘token’ 
in world politics, describing the MRP as a ‘tragedy’. Yet, any questioning 
of Eastern Europe’s ‘liberation’ by the Soviet Union has met his immediate 
rebuttal. In order to disperse Russian responsibility for the fate of the Baltics 
after World War II, he further argues that the West could not lay any blame 
on the USSR for annexing the Baltic states in particular since ‘these were the 
realities of those times, just as colonial policies were the realities of quite a 
large number of European countries’. Hence, just as the Allies ‘divided up 
the spheres of influence’, the Soviet Union simply ‘established its policies 
with its close neighbours and its allies … in its own image’ (Vīķe-Freiberga, 
2005a). Putin’s and his regime’s resistance to use the notion of occupation 
for describing the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states in the course of 
World War II exemplifies how using a word cannot be reduced to the mere 
application of a label: insofar as invoking a term calls up a range of further 
acts that should follow, the use of a particular word(ing) is essentially an act 
(see Fierke, 2002).
Russia’s selective remembrance of World War II exemplifies vividly how 
present concerns determine which past is remembered and how. For Russia, 
that is resolutely seeking to re-establish its international position amongst 
the ‘great powers’ today, the role of the MRP in sowing the seeds of World 
War II as well as leading to the ultimate subjugation of Eastern Europe 
under the Soviet yoke is largely irrelevant for it conflicts with Russia’s ‘usable 
remembrance’ of the war. Focusing instead on the Soviet Union’s hugely 
costly victory over Nazism enables Putin’s regime to position Russia firmly 
among the ‘normal’ European countries. The attempts to institutionally 
monopolize and fix certain meanings of the past further demonstrate that 
the ‘inter pretation wars’ over past events are substantially struggles over 
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power — as the control over the narratives of the past facilitates control 
over the construction of further narratives for an imagined future. Hence, 
the Russian political elites’ maintenance of the narrative of the Baltic states’ 
voluntary joining with the Soviet Union consequently allows it to shed its 
responsibility for the communist crimes in the region as well as to demand 
full citizenship and political rights for the Russians living there since the 
Soviet period. The culpability of the official Russian stance vis-à-vis the 
record of World War II does not then really lie in selecting those parts of 
the past that it wishes to preserve (which is, after all, human, all too human), 
but in granting itself a ‘natural’ right to decide what would be available to 
others (i.e. the victims of the Soviet regime). In a manner characteristic of a 
great power, the Soviet Union used a method of organized forgetting in the 
Baltic states and Poland over the communist period in order to try to deprive 
them of their national consciousnesses. In a similar fashion, as we will see 
below, when Russia encounters interpretations of history that diverge from 
its own, the propaganda war for getting across its own version of the past 
events usually follows.
Nevertheless, the vigorous memory-political offensive by Vīķe-Freiberga 
found considerable support and understanding among the Baltics’ and 
Poland’s Euro-Atlantic partners. In his letter to the Latvian president, US 
president George W. Bush, for example, reminded her that while ‘in Western 
Europe, the end of WWII meant liberation’, in Central and Eastern Europe, 
‘the war also marked the Soviet occupation and annexation of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania and the imposition of communism’ (2005a). Bush’s ‘pit-stop’ 
in Riga a few days before his attendance at the Moscow commemorations to 
mark the anniversary of World War II was also read as a signal of sympathy 
to the Baltic states as well as an attempt to balance the Russian self-glorifying 
emphasis on Nazi Germany’s defeat with a condemnation of the subsequent 
Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe. Bush even acknowledged that the 
US bore some blame for the ‘division of Europe into armed camps’, vowing 
never again to trade freedom for stability, thus arguably also providing 
a model for Putin to renounce the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states 
(2005b). The US Congress, in turn, passed a resolution on 22 July 2005 in 
sup port of the Baltic case, arguing that ‘the truth is a powerful weapon for 
healing, forgiving and reconciliation, but its absence breeds distrust, fear, 
and hostility’ (Congress of the United States of America, 2005), thus seeking 
an acknowledgement and condemnation by the Russian Federation of the 
Soviet Union’s occupation of the Baltic states.
The official declaration of the European Commission issued on Europe 
Day was much more lukewarm in its tone, promising euphemistically to 
remember also ‘the many millions for whom the end of the Second World 
War was not the end of dictatorship, and for whom true freedom was only 
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to come with the fall of the Berlin Wall’ (2005). The respective resolution 
of the European Parliament (EP), entitled ‘The Future of Europe Sixty 
Years after the Second World War’, pointed more directly to the ‘renewed 
tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union’ on East European nations 
after the end of World War II, and acknowledged the ‘magnitude of the 
suffering, injustice and long-term social, political and economic degradation 
endured by the captive nations located on the eastern side of what was to 
become the Iron Curtain’ (2005). The resolution explicitly highlighted the 
significance of keeping the memories of the past alive, ‘because there cannot 
be reconciliation without truth and remembrance’. Further, it confirmed 
the EP’s united stand against ‘all totalitarian rule of whatever ideological 
persuasion’; welcomed ‘the fact that the Central and Eastern European 
states and peoples can now also enjoy freedom and the right to determine 
their destiny after so many decades under Soviet domination or occupation 
or other communist dictatorships’, and called on all countries to open their 
archives pertaining to World War II (European Parliament, 2005).
Yet again, however, very different treatments of Europe’s immediate past 
clashed during the preparations that preceded the adoption of the final 
version of the document. There were MEPs who regarded the resolution as 
‘a repellent exercise in revisionism and historical distortion’, as a ‘dreadful 
falsi fication of history’ aiming to ‘wipe out the key contribution made by the 
Soviet Union and its people’s glorious struggle to destroy the brutal killing 
machine of the Nazi Fascist armies and regimes’; moreover, as an attempt to 
‘silence and defame the glorious and heroic role played by the communists 
in the anti-fascist struggle’ (Guerreiro, 2005). Refuting thus the attempts 
to compare the crimes of communism with those of Nazism, these voices 
argued vigorously against ‘indistinctly muddling 8 May 1945 with the crimes 
of Stalinism’ (Catania, 2005; cf. Wurtz, 2005).14
The Baltic and Polish endeavours to seek international condemnation of 
the crimes of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe bore more fruit 
with the adoption of the relevant resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE) on 25 January 2006, which explicitly 
con demned the crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes. This 
resolution acknowledges that the fall of totalitarian communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe has not been followed in all cases by an 
inter national investigation of the crimes committed by them, nor have 
the perpetrators of these crimes been brought to trial by the international 
com munity in a similar fashion to the way in which Nazi crimes were 
once addressed in Nuremberg. Consequently, the resolution points to the 
fact that public awareness of crimes committed by totalitarian communist 
regimes is ‘very poor’. Acknowledging that the awareness of history is one 
of the pre conditions for avoiding similar crimes in the future, the resolution 
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regards the moral assessment and condemnation of the communist crimes 
as playing an important role in the education of the younger generations 
and thus preventing history from repeating itself. Condemning the massive 
human rights violations committed by the totalitarian communist regimes, 
the resolution also expresses sympathy to the victims of these crimes, thus 
calling for extending moral restitution for their sufferings.15 Furthermore, 
the resolution calls on all communist or post-communist parties in its 
member states to reassess the history of communism and their own past in 
case they had not done it already, to ‘clearly distance themselves from the 
crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes and condemn them 
without any ambiguity’ (PACE, 2006; cf. OSCE PA, 2009).
Yet, PACE’s draft recommendation calling on European governments to 
adopt a similar declaration on the international condemnation of crimes of 
totalitarian communist regimes, to carry out legal investigations of individuals 
engaged in such crimes and create the prerequisites for the ‘memory work’ 
of the European nations that had suffered under the communist regimes (i.e. 
open up the archives, build monuments and museums commemorating the 
victims, revise the textbooks, or introduce national commemoration days) 
did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority of the votes cast. Notably 
also, the final text of the resolution did not even mention the Soviet Union, 
not least as a result of the successive Russian mobilization of the European 
ultra-leftists and communists to oppose the resolution as such, or at least 
to disperse, erase and reword several paragraphs of the resolution’s initial 
project.16
The debates over the condemnation of the crimes of communism in dif-
ferent European fora as well as the ‘crisis of May 2005’ brought forward the 
special case status of Poland and the Baltic states, in particular, in European 
history and politics while simultaneously making a case against their different 
treatment in the collective remembering of World War II in Europe. The 
political controversies around the 60th anniversary of World War II could be 
regarded as a turning point in European memory politics. The intense public 
debates and the unprecedented international attention given to the Baltic 
cause in particular helped to illuminate and clarify the diverging perceptions 
of the past, thus raising the general awareness about diverse historical 
legacies of the war and their direct impact on today’s politics in different 
parts of Europe (cf. Onken, 2007: 43–4).
‘East is East, and West is West, and Never the Twain Shall Meet?’17
Yet, it is difficult but to agree with Duncan Bell who predicts that conflict 
rather than harmony determines the contours of future mnemonic politics of 
Europe (2006: 16). For the Baltic states and Poland, the subjugation to the 
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Soviet rule and the eventual end of the Cold War emerge as the constitutive 
events of the past 50 years. For Western Europeans, the German–French 
reconciliation tends to figure as a central landmark in the post-World War II 
collective historical consciousness.
As the terrain of memory of the ‘united Europe’ remains as contested as 
ever, there does not seem to be much space for any great optimism about 
the early emergence of a common European self-conceptualization. It is 
questionable whether producing a single and definitive collective ‘version of 
the past’ that is commonly shared by the public within a given community is 
at all possible or even desirable. There is thus also some hope in this scarcity 
of an all-European mnemonical consensus, for the struggle over memory 
is nevertheless preferable to the prospect of a politically institutionalized 
col lective memory as an infinitely closed book (à la George Orwell) which 
would inevitably subordinate some sets of victims and ideals to the over-
arching narratives of the others.
Calls for a common historical memory for Europe have therefore inevitably 
revealed certain sore points that have traditionally been put under cover for 
the sake of the ‘united Europe’ myth. Apparently, Europe’s history has been 
written as that of the sum of national histories that have been considered 
to be more important, thus leading to the ‘marginalisation or complete 
ex clusion of smaller or “peripheral” states and alternative topics’ (see 
Fulbrook, 1993: 2). There has been a noticeable bias in favour of Western 
and Southern Europe to the detriment of Northern and Eastern Europe in 
writing the history of ‘Europe’. Moreover, according to Davies, ‘automatic 
priority is given to positive and uplifting aspects of the past, whilst negative 
or disturbing subjects are systematically avoided’, leading him to conclude 
that Western civilization is a ‘power cult’ indeed (2006: 49–50). Rebelling 
against the Western European rendering of their own mnemonic culture 
as obli gatory for all others, the Polish and Baltic reappropriation of their 
pasts and their attempts to bring these ‘minority pasts’ into the common 
European historical consciousness challenge the long-term tendency of the 
old Western core of the EU to act as a model for the whole of Europe. 
After all, remembering certain events does not only define the content of a 
collective memory but also the extent of the remembering community (Eder, 
2006: 267). Any remembrance is inevitably already marked by forgetting and 
the complex question of Western co-responsibility for Eastern Europeans’ 
post-war submission under communist rule only made the intentional 
‘forgetting’ of certain aspects of World War II more attractive for them (cf. 
Zehfuss, 2006, 2007).
What is really needed, then, is a critical history of the politics of ‘common 
European memory’ of World War II that would expose the dense ambiguity 
and complexity of the past as well as show the genealogical ‘becoming’ of 
 by guest on March 20, 2015ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Mälksoo: The Memory Politics of Becoming European
673
certain institutionalized versions of it. As any politically endorsed collective 
memory is essentially the product of specific power relations, it is important 
to explore how and why it has emerged in a particular form as well as the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion that have underpinned it. Who has been, 
at the end of the day, the ‘we’ doing the remembering of World War II in 
the EU? Poland’s and the Baltics’ desire to be heard in Europe hence also 
implies their commitment to making history of this mnemonical community 
(cf. de Certeau, 1997: 32).
Yet, the project of a united Europe will probably require the readjust-
ment of historical narratives from all sides to allow for a more heterocentric 
European mnemonical vision to emerge. It is also fair to assume that just 
as European national identities are influenced, but not replaced, by a ‘com-
mon European identity’, national memories are likewise transfigured by a 
transnational European collective memory under the impact of European-
ization, yet not substituted for it (cf. Spohn, 2005: 3–4). Furthermore, the 
accumulation of different ‘subaltern European pasts’ does not automatically 
produce new knowledge and understandings of European history, as besides 
factual authenticity it arguably matters a great deal through what structural 
access and under what socio-historical conditions people come to an aware-
ness of these pasts (see Yoneyama, 2004: 456).
At the end of the day, it would be a categorical mistake to predict the 
imminent emergence of the common European historical vision in the first 
place. The question remains whether it would really be viable to produce a 
better representational account of Europe’s problematic history in a singular 
pan-European narrative which would not merely incite a further proliferation 
of different histories. As the attempts to invent a shared past only tend to 
provoke more or less violent expressions of difference, it seems advisable for 
the EU not to focus on ‘settling its memory problem’, but to try to allow 
space for competing narratives, and find peaceful, if agonizing, ways to 
express and provoke different versions of the past instead. The conflicting 
claims made by various national and subnational representatives of ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Europeans should be given consideration, highlighting how and why 
certain historical events have acquired particular significance for different 
communities in the East and West of Europe.
Notes
 1. The subtlety of subnational mnemonical cleavages that was most recently 
exposed in Estonia during the ‘Bronze Soldier’ controversy in the spring of 2007 
remains out of the scope of this article. On this, see further Mälksoo (2009). For 
a thorough study of remembrance practices that might challenge state power and 
encourage radical political change, see Edkins (2003).
 by guest on March 20, 2015ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
European Journal of International Relations 15(4)
674
 2. For a perceptive discussion about the unlikelihood of a fully harmonized 
European memory on World War II, see Bell (2006). Yet, he argues that to 
entirely rule out the possibility of future transformation would also be unwise, 
which only makes the study of the transnational dissemination of memory across 
various contexts more important.
 3. Cf. de Certeau (1986).
 4. With the remarkable exception of Courtois et al. (1999). Cf. Solzhenitsyn 
(1974) and Applebaum (2003).
 5. This has not been quite the case with the academic and political attention 
dedicated to the crimes of communism in the United States (US) where during 
the Cold War considerable resources were put into the research and publicity 
of these issues. Yet, much of the early US research on the topic also had clearly 
propagandistic aims. Characteristically against this backdrop, the monument to 
the victims of communism has also been raised in the US, not in Europe.
 6. Although the emergence of ‘Eurocommunism’ in the mid-1970s, as a result of 
Western European left-wing intelligentsia’s gradual awakening to the Stalinist 
crimes and the adjacent heated debates, nevertheless cleared some of the air in 
that regard.
 7. Cf. Meri (2000). Calls to establish an international museum in the US dedicated 
to the commemoration and research of the crimes of communism by the example 
of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, constitute a paradigmatic quest 
in that context. Cf. Luik (2008).
 8. For an elaboration on this theme, see Mälksoo (2006: 283–6).
 9. In a curious resemblance, Eastern European nations’ post-Cold War ‘mnemo-
political unfreezing’ has been as slow and recalcitrant towards recognizing the 
‘other in oneself’ — their own participation in massive abuses of human rights 
in the course of World War II not merely as victims but also as perpetrators. 
Consider, for instance, the Polish collaboration in the 1941 Jedwabne massacre 
of hundreds of Jews, or general sensitivity towards acknowledging the sufferings 
of the German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe.
10. Also, the Red Army fought in Prague till 9 May 1945. Technically, however, 
World War II did not end for the Soviet Union before the surrender of Japan in 
late August since the USSR had joined the Allies’ war against Japan on 8 August 
1945, just about a week before the latter’s ultimate capitulation.
11. However, while the end of the war was already celebrated in Europe, the fighting 
in Asia carried on.
12. Again, Nazism’s status as ‘absolute evil’ has been more nuanced in the post-
World War II US where Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia became merged under 
the catchphrase of ‘Red Fascism’ in the American image of totalitarianism.
13. Accordingly, Russia has denied access to documents regarding the assassination 
of Polish reserve officers in the Katyn Forest in the spring of 1940 by the Soviet 
security police.
14. It was only on 30 March 2009 when the EP unequivocally condemned the 
crimes of the totalitarian communist regimes.
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15. According to Courtois et al. (1999), approximately 20 million people fell victim 
to Soviet mass crimes from the 1920s to the 1950s; the Soviet occupation and de 
facto control in Central and Eastern Europe, in turn, resulted in approximately 
one million victims.
16. The practice-oriented initiative of members of the EP from former communist 
countries (spearheaded by Jószef Szájer from Hungary and Vytautas Landsbergis 
from Lithuania) to urge the EU ban of the communist symbols (i.e. sickle and 
hammer) alongside the swastika, proved ultimately unsuccessful as well.
17. The subtitle is a quotation from Rudyard Kipling’s The Ballad of East and West 
(1895).
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